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Recent studies report that equity market liberalisation positively correlates with total return,
which in turn purportedly increases private investment growth.  While the finding on reform
and performance is generally robust to alternative perspectives on capital account
liberalisation that emphasise over-heating and volatility, this crucial first link in the causal
chain is not wholly robust empirically.  For example, previous findings are very sensitive to
alternative definitions of precise liberalisation event dates.  Also, spatial variance seems to
drive significant results in panel regressions, which is problematic for interpreting the
particular path from equity prices to private investment.  Finally, existing studies do not
satisfactorily control for other determinants of returns, and extreme bound analysis (EBA)
suggests that liberalisation is spurious.
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1.  Introduction
Whether capital account liberalisation has positive real macroeconomic effects in
lower income countries is a considerably controversial issue.  Nonetheless, despite the
general dearth of evidence (Fischer, 1999), a few recent empirical studies report benevolent
direct real effects of capital flows – including foreign direct investment (FDI)
(Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Borensztein et al., 1998) and foreign portfolio investment
(FPI) (Bekeart and Harvey, 1998) – on growth and private investment.  Additional work
focuses on indirect effects through financial variables such as stock market development and
performance (Henry, 2000a, 2000b; Levine and Zervos, 1998b).  This paper re-examines the
short-run financial and, by implication, the real effects of stock market liberalisation through
valuation.
Theory suggests that liberalisation, first, lowers the cost of equity capital and
concomitantly produces an aggregate price appreciation, and, second, boosts private
investment as erstwhile negative net present values (NPVs) become positive following
reform.  Several studies report a positive correlation between liberalisation and stock market
performance (Henry, 2000a; Bekaert and Harvey, 1998; Froot et al., 1998), and fewer
complete the transmission mechanism to private investment booms (Henry, 2000b).  The
policy implications for poorer countries are lucidly compelling – encourage stock market
development, especially foreign equity inflows, and expect greater private investment (and
growth).
But unfortunately, shortcomings beset the initial primary empirical link in the grand
mechanism from reform to price appreciation to (private) investment.  While the finding is
generally robust given explicit controls for alternative and less optimistic perspectives on
financial flows, particularly those that focus on over-heating and volatility, the statistical
relation is highly sensitive to assessments of when the liberalisation event precisely occurs.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 3
Also, problematic for the contention that corporate managers issue new equity at higher
prices to fund investment after liberalisation, previous results on valuation heavily rely on
spatial as opposed to temporal variance, as most individual time-series equations do not
corroborate panel model results.
Leaving aside the appropriateness of event study methodology and interpretation of
cross-sectional variance vis-à-vis adaptations of Tobin’s q related theory, the purportedly
significant
1 link between liberalisation and real total returns is not robust to alternative
specifications.  That is, liberalisation is not the only purported determinant of stock market
performance.  Rather, the literature on market anomalies is burgeoning, and previous
literature does not satisfactorily control for other factors.  Therefore, following recent studies
on stock market anomalies (Durham, 2000a, 2000b) and earlier literature on growth
regressions (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b) as well as the demand for
money (Hess et al., 1998; Cooley and LeRoy, 1980), this paper uses extreme bound analysis
(EBA) to determine specification bias.  The results generally suggest that liberalisation is
generally, as well as comparatively with respect to other factors, a spurious determinant.
Therefore, with respect to interpretation, the benevolent theoretical transmission
mechanism from liberalisation to market performance to investment (and growth) is less
persuasive if the first step is econometrically dubious.  Of course, policy implications for
poorer countries therefore are less straightforward.  Perhaps stock market development does
in fact positively affect long-run performance (Levine and Zervos, 1996, 1998a), a research
question beyond the scope of this study, but the short-run implications of equity market
reform for lower income countries remain unclear.
                                                       
1 Unless otherwise noted, this paper uses ‘significant’ to mean statistical as opposed to economic significance,
as outlined in McCloskey and Ziliak (1996).  That is, a statistically significant parameter is distinct from the null
hypothesis (of zero) according to some statistical test and (arbitrary) decision rule.  Such a parameter is not
necessarily economically significant, meaning the size of the parameter (the salience of the estimated impact) is
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Section 2 briefly outlines the general debate on the financial and real effects of
international financial flows and capital account reform with particular respect to stock
market liberalisation.  Section 3 tests alternative perspectives on liberalisation.  This includes
explicit consideration of the alternative ‘boom-and-bust’ or ‘over-heating’ perspective,
volatility in stock market returns, alternative liberalisation dates, and individual time-series
regressions.  Section 4 performs a broad sensitivity analysis of return in emerging markets
and explores particular specifications under which liberalisation is fragile.  Section 5
concludes.
2.  Recent literature on equity market liberalisation and financial and real effects
FPI does not exhibit the advantages of FDI with respect to dissemination of
technology and (more arguably) capital flow stability according to conventional wisdom.  But
nevertheless, some economists advance the virtues of cross-border equity investment.  For
example, in his general overview of proposals for reducing global financial instability –
including international bankruptcy courts, capital controls, and the prospect of a global
central bank – Rogoff (1999) recommends a substantial shift from debt to equity finance.  He
argues that equity finance introduces risk sharing, via reductions in moral hazard with
ownership, as well as more efficient resource allocation, via (share) price signalling.  His
advocacy broadly reflects some recent studies (Levine and Zervos, 1996, 1998a) that produce
a positive statistical correlation between aggregate stock market development measures (such
as relative capitalisation, turnover, and volume) and long-run growth.
Similarly consistent with this benevolent perspective on stock market development
and equity finance, recent literature suggests that stock market liberalisation – the decision to
allow foreigners to investment in the domestic stock market – has positive real affects.  For
example, a (very) long-run perspective implies that reform encourages stock marketQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 5
development, which in turn boosts macroeconomic performance (Levine and Zervos, 1996,
1998a, 1998b).  While previous evidence perhaps curiously rests on samples that include
OECD countries,
 2 the tacit implication for lower income countries is that equity forms of FPI
eventually produce sustained expansion.
Also, a second perspective, which is the focus of this paper, addresses the short-run
effects of liberalisation on private investment through (windfall) increases in equity prices
upon liberalisation.  For example, Henry (2000a, 2000b) documents temporary increases in
private investment growth rates among a sample of 11 developing countries
3 that liberalised
their stock markets during the 1977 to 1994 period (notably before the Tequila crisis).  He
argues that stock market liberalisation in general lowers the cost of capital, k,
4 and therefore
concomitantly increases aggregate stock prices in emerging markets.
5  Given the decrease in
k and holding expected cash flows constant, some investment projects with negative NPVs
before liberalisation exhibit positive NPVs afterwards, which induces increased private
                                                       
2 Durham (2000d) produces some evidence that suggests that data from developed countries largely drive the
correlation between growth and stock market development.
3 These include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Venezuela.  He finds that in the first, second, and third years after liberalisation, 9, 10 and 8 of the 11
sample countries, respectively, had growth rates of private investment above their non-liberalisation medians.
He reports that growth rates return to their pre-liberalisation by the fourth year after reform.
4 Henry cites three arguments that liberalisation lowers k (p. 2).  First, ‘liberalisation can increase net inflows,
which could reduce the risk free rate.’  Second, foreign participation in the domestic equity market ‘facilitates
risk sharing across borders,’ which ‘should reduce the equity premium.’  Third, ‘increased capital inflows may
also increase stock market liquidity,’ which purportedly reduces the equity premium.  This contention is based
on evidence that lower liquidity stocks have higher returns (Ahimud and Mendelson, 1986).  He clearly notes,
however, the possibility that the risk-free rate might rise upon liberalisation if ‘the autarky risk-free rate, which
is an equilibrium outcome of aggregate savings and investment, is above or below the world rate’ (ft. 2).  More
generally, Henry suggests that ‘(t)he central message…is not that the stock market liberalisation will in all cases
lead to a fall in a country’s cost of capital…(r)ather…stock market liberalisation may change the liberalising
country’s cost of capital, with attendant implications for physical investment’ (p. 13, emphasis added).
5 One can easily deduce the effect of decreased k on aggregate prices from the standard Gordon growth model of







where D refers to dividends, k is the cost of capital (composed of the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium),
and g is the expected growth rate of dividends.  All else equal (most contentiously g in the case of
liberalisation), a decrease in k produces an increase in P.  Of course, this formulation resembles the (mature)
steady state and an equilibrium in which the growth rate is necessarily less than the cost of capital.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 6
investment.
6  Therefore, the short-run benevolent mechanism from flows through the stock
market to the real economy follows:
(1)
Liberalization k Aggregate ices ivateInvestment ⇒↓ ↑ ⇒↑ ,P r P r .
7
Notably, increases in private investment do not merely substitute for direct investment
according to previous evidence.  Rather, Henry finds that the share of FDI to total investment
in general increased (p. 19).
8
Empirically, mechanism (1) of course implies two regularities.  First, liberalisation
must positively correlate with stock prices, and, second, such valuation changes should
increase private investment.  Notably, both dependent variables in this system – stock market
behaviour and private investment – are hardly understudied.  With respect to the first inquiry,
without tracing the effects ultimately to private investment, many studies report a positive
impact of flows on stock prices using distinct data sets as well as different observation
frequencies.
9  For example, Froot et al. (1998) report a positive correlation lagged equity
capital flows and stock returns using daily data from 28 emerging markets from 1994 to
1998.  Also, given lower frequency data and with varying degrees of qualification, Bekaert
and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000b) find that equity market liberalisation and/or flows
                                                       
6 Another important issue, as Henry (2000a) readily suggests, is possible simultaneity bias, which the use of
lower frequency data complicates.  Given daily price and flow information, Froot et al. (1998) find evidence
that, at least with respect to emerging markets, lagged flows help predict returns (pp. 3, 14).  While they fail to
control for broader global index performance, this broadly corroborates Henry’s contention that inflows lead to
price appreciation (rather than vice versa).
7 It seems somewhat unclear from Henry’s (2000b) evidence whether liberalisation has a direct effect on private
investment in addition to its (purported) gross effect on valuation.  While he illustrates through statistical
interaction terms that ‘liberalisation specific’ valuation changes have a significant effect on private investment,
he never includes liberalisation and valuation simultaneously in any specification of private investment growth.
If only gross liberalisation effects support the theory, then any lack of robust relation between reform and prices
would be very problematic for (1).
8 The cost of equity capital, k, is related to local market volatility (variance) in closed capital markets.  In open
markets, k is related to the covariance with world market returns.  Theory suggests that if the covariance is less
than the (domestic) variance, then the cost of equity capital should decrease after liberalisation.
9 Portes and Rey (1999) find no relation between flows and returns using annual data and suggest that the dearth
of their findings are due to data frequency.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 7
lowers the cost of capital, as measured by ex post returns and/or dividend yields, in emerging
markets.
10
Regarding the second empirical question, the supposed link between price
appreciation and real variables is critical, as Henry documents a ‘strong correlation’ between
the growth rate of investment and valuation changes, particularly stock price appreciation
associated with liberalisation.  As he notes, while some literature addresses this equation with
respect to higher-income countries, there is a dearth of studies on lower income countries,
and his (under-specified) regressions indicate that lagged one-year stock returns are
significant determinants of private investment growth rates.
11
The discussion now turns to evidence that supports the crucial first link in the causal
chain.
3.  Polemics on international capital flows:
Over-heating, volatility, liberalisation dates, and spatial variance
There are four shortcomings with respect to existing empirical estimations of equity
market channels that broadly stem from the debate on capital account liberalisation.  First,
existing studies consistent with (1) do not satisfactorily test the ‘boom-and-bust’ hypotheses
associated with more sceptical views of FPI, as there is a dearth tests that might capture the
longer-run effects of liberalisation on possible over-heating and asset price bubbles.  Second,
studies do not control for volatility (absolute risk), which increases upon liberalisation
according to some studies (Levine and Zervos, 1998b).  If volatility positively correlates with
                                                       
10 In particular, Henry (2000b) finds that stock market liberalisation is a robust determinant of returns in
equations that control for contemporaneous LDC, EAFE, and S&P500 index performance (p. 18).  However,
inclusion of macroeconomic fundamentals weakens the relation, as the dummy variables for trade and financial
reform are no longer statistically distinguishable (p. 21).
11 Durham (2000d) also argues that controlling for other factors in the literature, namely lagged GDP growth,
total private credit to GDP, government spending, and foreign exchange availability – vitiates the relation
between lagged valuation changes and private investment growth.  Moreover, he also finds that lagged valuation
does affect private investment in developed markets.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 8
(ex post) real total returns, as it should in (partially) segmented markets, such a relation
would perhaps vitiate the purported (ex ante) decrease in k.
Third, unlike most event studies in econometrics, coding the event in question, stock
market liberalisation, remains controversial.  In fact, various studies use different dates, and,
even more problematic, some economists argue that liberalisation is inherently a gradual
process given uncertainty regarding policymakers’ commitment to sustainable reform (which
might suggest that event studies per se are not necessarily appropriate).  Put simply, a sturdy
event relation between liberalisation and stock market returns (and therefore private
investment) should be robust to alternative dates based inherently on subjective assessments.
Finally, cross-sectional variance considerably informs previous results, which is wholly
sensible with respect to whether liberalisation affects returns.  However, with respect to the
particular transmission mechanism involving private investment decisions based on share
prices, perhaps price appreciation vis-à-vis previous levels is more germane to corporate
managers than relative stock market performance across space.
3.1.  Sustainable asset price increases versus over-heating
Assuming a robust link between liberalisation and stock market performance, does
liberalisation lead to sustainable increases in equity prices?  Similar to Henry (2000a),
Bekeart and Harvey (1998), and others, more pessimistic perspectives on capital account
liberalisation also posit asset price increases (upon monetary expansion).  However, such
observers explicitly consider the prospect of overshooting, as financial bubbles eventually
burst, and crises ensue (Calvo and Mendoza, 1999; Bhagwati, 1998).
12  Therefore, to
                                                       
12 Upon liberalisation, equity capital inflows could lead to rapid monetary expansion and a credit boom.
Moreover, under a floating exchange rate, the demand for local currency should lead to considerable currency
appreciation with potentially adverse effects on the trade balance.  Under a fixed regime, the monetary
authorities purchase of foreign currency could exacerbate monetary expansion (assuming no effective
sterilisation).  In either case, some observers would expect resulting overheating, eventual reductions in output,
and asset price contractions.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 9
augment previous studies that document increases in aggregate prices, is there some
measurable cyclical symmetry to the initial appreciation?  Put differently, how sustainable is
the purported decrease in the cost of capital?
13
Therefore, a useful econometric exercise is to test for lagged effects of liberalisation
and flows on possible asset price collapses.  Such a specification would not only address the
one-time increase in prices (and decrease in k) but also consider the possibility of over-
heating.  The general model resembles
(2)
RL I B L I B X e it t t w j = +++ + β β β β 01 2 3
where Rit is the total aggregate real market return for country i at time t, LIB is the event
dummy for liberalisation, w refers to the event window before and including the
implementation month, j represents various intervals after liberalisation that might capture
‘over-heating,’ and X is a set of control variables.  If β 1 is positive and significant, consistent
with previous studies, but β 2 is negative and significant, this would suggests that stock market
prices increase shortly after liberalisation but notably decrease after longer periods.
Depending of course on the relative values of β 1 and β 2, this result would seem to corroborate
the overheating perspective rather than the purely benevolent Tobin’s q
14 related transmission
mechanism from stock prices to private investment and the real economy.  This inquiry
addresses the longer-term effects of liberalisation as well as Bhagwati’s (1998, p. 10) general
suggestion that advocates of capital mobility fail ‘to evaluate its crisis-prone downside’.
                                                       
13 There is some econometric indication of this phenomenon.  Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find some evidence,
however sensitive to specification, that returns are lower in later periods following liberalisation.  For example,
they report that ‘(w)hereas we find a consistent decrease in dividend yields, excess returns may increase or
decrease from the pre- to post-liberalisation period depending on specification.  In the longer-term, average
returns appear to be lower’ (p. 25).  There are perhaps two conflicting interpretations.  On the one hand, one
could conclude that lower returns correspond with a lower equity premium and cost of capital.  On the other,
one might conjecture that in some cases, equity market liberalisation leads to price bubbles and market
collapses.
14 Of course, changes in stock market prices only represent a portion of the numerator in Tobin’s q.  Market
value also includes debt securities.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 10
More specifically, evaluation of (2) in this paper includes the 8-month liberalisation
window dummy to estimate β 1, and X comprises proxies for global equity market
performance – including the MSCI USA index, the MSCI EAFE index, and an index for less
developed countries (LDCs)
15 – as well as country specific dummy variables.  To inductively
test for the possible effect of systematic overheating, j alternatively comprises various lag
periods after liberalisation.  As Table 1A indicates, these include 6-, 8-, and 12-month
intervals up to four years after liberalisation.  For example, models 1 through 8 separately test
for over-heating for every 6-month interval from the first month until the forty-eighth month
after the event, and model 19 includes each of these post-liberalisation lags simultaneously,
again, controlling for the liberalisation event window and X.
  Turning to the results from Table 1A, 21 alternative forms of equation (2) fail to
indicate any consistent overheating after liberalisation events,
16 and importantly, the 8-month
liberalisation window is clearly significant in all models, as the column of t statistics
indicates.  While some intervals during the third and fourth years after liberalisation
(including models 6, 8, 12, 14, and 18) have negative coefficients, no parameter estimate is
statistically significant.
Perhaps more surprisingly, some intervals covering various segments of the first year
after liberalisation are (perversely) positive and statistically significant.  For example, the
interval from the seventh through the twelfth month after the event is significant (within the
                                                       
15 The LDC index in this paper follows the IFC composite index, which dates from January 1985.  The proxy for
LDC index returns from January 1976 through December 1984 follows the market capitalisation weighted
average of total returns for each available country in the IFC’s Emerging Markets Database.  The correlation
between this constructed proxy and the direct IFC composite index is 0.9957 using data from January 1985
through December 1997.
16 Similar to previous studies, panel regressions in this paper are temporally dominant, with considerably more
time periods than cases.  Therefore, similar to Durham (2000a, 2000b) econometric estimation follows FGLS
with panel-corrected standard errors (Greene, 1997, pp. 651-654; Kennedy, 1998, p. 231; Beck and Katz, 1995),
which entails OLS with its variance-covariance matrix estimated by (X'X)
-1X'WX(X'X)
-1, where W is an
estimate of the error variance-covariance matrix.  When T > N, the Parks-Kmenta method estimates the error
variance-covariance matrix with insufficient degrees of freedom.  The panel regressions also correct for possible
panel-specific serial correlation using the Prais-Winsten transformation.  The precise estimation command in
STATA is ‘xtpcse’ with the option ‘c(psar1)’.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 11
10 and 5 percent confidence intervals in models 2 and 19), and the larger estimate is nearly
equal to the point estimate for the liberalisation window (0.0342 versus 0.0346, model 19).
In addition, the dummy variable for the entire year after liberalisation is perhaps more clearly
significant (models 15 and 21), although the point estimates are between 78 and 76 basis
points lower than the liberalisation coefficient (models 15 and 21, respectively).
Economic interpretation of the apparent persistent positive effect after liberalisation
seems somewhat problematic for the perspective on a one-time price appreciation outlined in
mechanism (1).  As this preliminary evidence indicates, perhaps the event window is even
longer, extending not just before the announcement date due to information leaks, but also
afterwards because market participants possibly assign a non-zero probability to a reversal of
reform.
17  In other words, evidence of delayed appreciation might reflect the perceived
credibility of the stated commitment to liberalisation and the prolonged period required to
convince the market that policymakers will successfully implement reforms.
18
But in short, Table 1A most importantly indicates that increases in stock prices after
liberalisation are largely sustainable, at least with respect to systematically consistent possible
price collapses.  These results certainly do not suggest, however, that market bubbles never
develop after liberalisation.  But, this empirical exercise uncovers no common trends in
depreciation given this (limited) sample that is commensurable with previous studies.
3.2.  Volatility, Liberalisation, and Returns
Another unexplored theoretical issue, also in the context of the debate on international
capital flows, regards the simultaneously documented increase in stock prices (Henry, 2000b;
Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Froot et al., 1998) and augmentation in stock market volatility
                                                       
17 This possibility might be analogous to the notion behind medium-term return momentum on the firm level, as
market participants purportedly under-react to earnings announcements.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 12
(Levine and Zervos, 1998b) after liberalisation.  Again, several studies report a positive
relation between reform and returns, but Levine and Zervos (1998b, p. 1182) also note that
liberalisation tends to increase stock market volatility.
19  Therefore, does the one-time
increase in asset prices reflect the decrease in the cost of capital, or does the market simply
compensate investors for the increased (absolute) risk?  While variance is idiosyncratic in
integrated capital markets, it is an appropriate risk measure in segmented markets according
to theory (Bekaert et al., 1997, p. 45).
20
Indeed, as Table 1B illustrates, these data indicate a significant relation between
volatility and liberalisation events.
21  A panel regression of 12 emerging markets from
January 1986 through December 1994, which replicates previous samples as closely as
possible, suggests that volatility (the estimated standard deviation) increases on average by
approximately 1.9 percent during the 8-month liberalisation window, which is significant
within the 5-percent confidence interval (model 1).
22  Also, a few individual (univariate)
time-series regressions corroborate the relation, as data for Argentina suggest a 25.06 percent
monthly increase in volatility upon liberalisation (model 2), and the equation for Thailand
indicates a 5.91 percent increase (model 12).  Finally, albeit at the 10 percent confidence
interval, data indicate a 2.81 percent increase for Malaysia (model 8), but no other model
yields significant results.
                                                                                                                                                                           
18 This perhaps reflects the potential bias in defining liberalisation events ex post.  None of the events, for
example, coded in Henry (2000a, 2000b) entail reform announcements followed by reneging of actual
implementation.
19 The distinction between temporal and spatial variance with respect to this finding is noteworthy.  While
Levine and Zervos (1998b) find increases in volatility in individual time-series after liberalisation, they also
note that with respect to the cross-section of stock markets that less integrated markets are more volatile (p.
1173).  Furthermore, Bekaert (1995, p. 95) finds that market integration and volatility co-vary negatively, and
Tesar and Werner (1995, p. 126) also report that the volume of equity flows from the United States also
correlates negatively with volatility as well as market turnover.  One might conjecture, then, that liberalisation
might increase volatility in the short- run but decrease volatility in the long-run.
20 Markets might not be fully integrated after the liberalisation ‘event.’  Indeed, the very controversy
surrounding precise event dates (and therefore market segmentation) noted in Section 3.3 suggests that variance
be an appropriate risk measure.
21 The calculations cover January 1986 through December 1994, which most closely matches Henry’s (2000b)
sample, as data for all 12 countries are available during this period.
22 This model includes an intercept and country-specific dummies.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 13
This significant correlation between volatility and liberalisation, which the panel
regression documents and some time-series models corroborate, begs the question of whether
previous models of return and liberalisation, such as (2), are under-specified and only capture
the gross effect of the event, which might over-state its direct influences.  More formally, the
gross effect of liberalisation on stock returns, β G,R,  follows
(3)
β G,R = β D,R + (β D,V ×  α D,R)
where β D,R is the direct effect of liberalisation on returns controlling for volatility, β D,V is the
direct effect of liberalisation on volatility, and α D,R is the direct effect of volatility on return
controlling for liberalisation.  Given that some evidence indicates that β D,V is positive,
estimates of α D,R would seem imperative, because a positive and significant coefficient would
suggest that β G,R overstates the effect of liberalisation on growth.
23  This specification
question is perhaps of significant interest to observers that emphasise volatility in the context
of international capital flows, and of course, simply controlling for absolute risk should shed
light on this issue.
But notably, the data seem to indicate that the effect of volatility on return is
ambiguous.  Individual time-series models for Argentina and Korea suggest a positive and
robust relation within the 10 and 5 percent confidence intervals, respectively (models 14 and
19), but the remaining parameters are insignificant.  Moreover, data for Mexico, perhaps
perversely, indicate a very strong negative effect (an approximate 0.7293 percent decrease in
return per one percent increase in volatility) that is within the one percent confidence interval
(model 21), and the corresponding panel regression for the 12 markets indicates no
significant effect (model 26).  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the direct estimate for
                                                       
23 Put somewhat differently, consideration of the full system of equations helps indicate whether the indirect
effect of liberalisation on returns through volatility overshadows its direct effect.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 14
α D,R indicates that volatility has no significant effect on return, controlling for liberalisation,
which is safely significant and positive within the 5 percent confidence interval (model 27).
Therefore, these data suggest that the increase in volatility (variance) associated with
liberalisation does not effect the apparent positive direct effect of reform on valuation.  In
fact, the indirect effect of liberalisation through volatility is insignificant, which broadly
supports the perspective on k.  One should note, however, that the key variable of interest in
the context, volatility, is not measured directly but is an estimate following Schwert (1989,
pp. 1117-1118) and Levine and Zervos (1998b).  The preceding analysis would be more
precise if daily total return data were available to estimate (non-overlapping) monthly
volatility, but nonetheless, available data seem to support the first step in mechanism (1).
3.3.  Alternative dates for ‘liberalisation’
While previous estimates of the effect of liberalisation on stock market performance
often follow an event study methodology, researchers readily confess that, unlike other
applications, the event in question is difficult to define (Henry, 2000a; Levine and Zervos,
1998).
24  Estimates follow essentially historical analyses of reforms or more technical
examination of structural breaks in the autocorrelation of cross-border equity flows, but the
literature produces no consensus on when the crucial event in question occurs.  The question,
then, is whether findings with respect to stock market returns are robust to this
methodological controversy.
Some studies include some limited sensitivity analysis in this regard.  For example,
Henry (2000a) lists alternative liberalisation dates from various studies, and reruns the
analysis coding for all ‘unique dates’ across four separate studies,
25 and the exercise largely
                                                       
24 Levine and Zervos (1998, p. 1173) write that ‘(s)electing…key dates when a country importantly changed
policies toward international capital flows is both arduous and, ultimately, less systematic than we would like.’
25 That is, if two or more authors have two different liberalisation dates for the same cases, Henry assigns a
value of ‘1’ for both dates.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 15
confirms his general findings.  However, notably no study separately tests for each complete
coding alternative.  Toward that end, Table 1C lists the results for the baseline panel
regression using alternative event dates from Henry (2000a), Bekaert and Harvey (1998),
Kim and Singal (1999), and Levine and Zervos (1998).
The data clearly suggests that the results are highly fragile to coding scheme.  For
example, with respect to the 8-month event window, both Henry’s coding and the unique
dates from all four studies produce statistically significant results with the expected sign and
general magnitude (rows 1 and 2).  But, as rows 3 through 5 indicate, no other coding
produces significant results within any conventional confidence interval.  In fact, no scheme
from Bekeart and Harvey (1998), Kim and Singal (1999), or Levine and Zervos (1998b) is
significant for any event window given Henry’s (unbalanced panel) sample from January
1976 through December 1994.  In fact, every coefficient using the dates from Levine and
Zervos (1998b) is negative, which suggests a perverse effect.  Therefore, in general these
results imply that the significant empirical relation between liberalisation and returns depends
critically upon (perhaps unsystematic) assessment of singular event dates.
26
3.4.  Temporal versus Spatial Variance
In general, supplementing panel regressions with time-series analysis helps indicate
the relative importance of variance across time and space given a particular panel result.  In
fact, perhaps the issue of temporal versus spatial variance is particularly crucial with respect
to the purported transmission mechanism from liberalisation to stock prices to private
investment levels.  Of course, significant and positive cross-sectional findings with respect to
liberalisation would indicate that, at any given point in time, a bourse that undergoes
liberalisation has greater total returns than non-liberalising markets.  Conversely, time-series
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evidence vis-à-vis the hypothesis would indicate that, irrespective of the particular case, total
returns are greater in a given market during the 8-month liberalisation window compared to
periods during which there is no such reform.  As the panel regressions imply, both variance
across space and over time is germane to the general question of whether liberalisation boosts
stock market performance.
But, with more particular respect to the hypothesis regarding the effect on private
investment, perhaps temporal variance is more germane.  Again, the argument is that
managers in liberalising stock markets experience a decrease in k, NPVs increase, and private
investment increases.  Simply, it would seem that indigenous equity price changes with
respect to previous local levels would be more relevant that the comparative performance of
the local market vis-à-vis other foreign bourses.
27  The relative temporal change in k seems to
be critical according to theory, as NPVs turn from negative to positive notably over time,
before and after reform.
Table 1D helps indicate the relative extent to which temporal and spatial variance
inform the panel estimates.  Notably, among 12 cases in the ‘baseline’ panel regressions, only
the time-series regression for Colombia (which has only 120 observations), produces a
positive and significant coefficient for the 8-month event window within the 5 percent
confidence interval (model 9).  The estimate for Malaysia is positive and significant at the 10
percent level (model 10), but the remaining 10 cases – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Korea,
Mexico, Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Venezuela – are clearly not robust.  In fact,
while again not significant, three cases – Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela – actually a negative
effect of liberalisation.  Therefore, perhaps problematic for the comprehensive mechanism
from liberalisation to real variables, spatial variance seems to drive the overall panel result.
                                                       
27 This should not be confused with the notion that k is related to the covariance (variance) of the local market in
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4.  Motivation for More General Sensitivity Analyses
Findings regarding the effect of stock market liberalisation and returns are robust to
the boom-and-bust perspective and explicit consideration of the effect of reform on stock
market volatility.  However, the analysis nonetheless suggests that these findings are highly
sensitive to the precise coding of when liberalisation occurs and whether cross-sectional
variance informs the estimates.  These findings cast some doubt on the short-run real effects
of equity FPI in general and reform in particular.
But beyond the debate on capital account liberalisation, several studies suggest that
many variables, seemingly unrelated to economic reforms, supposedly exhibit statistically
significant relations with stock market performance.  The literature on such anomalies is vast,
which begs the question of whether previous findings regarding liberalisation, however
sensitive to the issues raised in the previous section, are robust to broader specifications of
the dependent variable.  In addition, low overall fit measures for regressions in the previous
section imply considerable unexplained variance, and therefore identification of possible
missing variables seems prudent.  But generally, how statistically significant is reform in the
much broader context of the study of stock market behaviour?
4.1.  Extreme Bound Analysis
As Durham (2000a, 2000b, 2000c) argues, the rigor of asset pricing studies is less
advanced compared to sensitivity analyses of growth regressions,
28 as very few studies
satisfactorily control for competing explanations of market anomalies.  With respect to the
question of stock market liberalisation, the specification of real returns is sensible with
respect to variables related to reforms, but nonetheless incomplete considering a much
broader literature on market behaviour.
                                                       
28 With respect to emerging market returns, Durham (2000a) finds that no emerging market factor is robust
according to the extreme decision rule, while five variables are robust to the CDF criterion.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 18
Therefore, to help assess the relative robustness of the financial effects of
liberalisation, this section evaluates 14 additional anomalies germane to emerging markets
studies using EBA.  While the details of EBA with respect to this general research question
can be found elsewhere (Durham, 2000a, 2000b) the basic framework follows
(4)
Rit = α j + β zjz + β fjf + β xjxj + ε
where Rit is real total return, z is the ‘doubtful’ variable of interest, f is the set of ‘free’
variables that appear in every regression, and x includes variables from the set of 14 other
‘doubtful’ variables, χ .  The EBA entails running M regressions that consider every possible
linear combination of three variables from χ  in x.
29  Of course, the z variable of interest is
liberalisation, using particular dates and event windows that produce significant results in
(under-specified) previous studies.  Following previous studies, f includes three aggregate
equity indices – MSCI USA, MSCI EAFE, and the IFC (emerging market) composite – as
well as country dummy variables (and a constant term).
With respect to χ , the sensitivity analysis should include most reasonable theories,
and a very brief description of alternative hypotheses is instructive.  For example, a sizeable
literature examines value factors
30 (Fama and French, 1998), and therefore the EBA employs
P/B, P/E, and D/P IFC ratios.  Also, χ  includes price history variables.  The most simple and
succinct views include “contrarian” strategies in the short- (Jegadeesh, 1990)
31 and long-term
(De Bondt and Thaler, 1985), which exploit purported negative autocorrelations, and
“relative strength” strategies in the medium-run (three to 12 months), which utilise supposed
                                                       
29 This follows Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) and, more importantly, a typical number of exogenous variables in
multi-factor models of returns.  Therefore, the total number of M regressions to evaluate the robustness of
liberalisation vis-à-vis other variables is (14! ÷  [3!  ×  11!]) 364.
30 Members of the same family of factors are nonetheless independent variables.  In fact, Fama and French
(1998) note that, while value strategies, portfolios formed on P/B, P/E, D/P, and P/C are nonetheless distinct (p.
1985).  An equation with sufficient degrees of freedom isolates the separate effects of variables from the same
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positive autocorrelations (Asness et al., 1997).  Turning to macroeconomics, as Bekaert et al.,
1997 suggest, inflation should have a negative impact on cash flows, primarily via price
signaling and operating cost shocks, and (univariate) empirical tests confirm the relation
(Asprem, 1989).  In addition, to capture published findings regarding population
demographics (Erb et al., 1997a), the EBA includes the lagged proportion of the population
older than 65.  Furthermore, some researchers argue that survey measures of country risk
correlate with stock returns,
32 especially in emerging markets (Erb et al., 1995, 1996, and
1997b, Bekaert et al., 1997, Ferson and Harvey, 1997).  Somewhat related, Bekaert et al.
(1997) find that relative market size is significant, and Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1991)
argue that low-liquidity firms enjoy abnormal long-term returns within certain parameters.
Also, non-equity financial development also conceivably relates to returns, as Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (1996) find that stock market volatility significantly correlates with banking
system development.  Finally, the doubtful set includes the January effect.
The first EBA purports to replicate previous samples as closely as possible.  The data
cover the same 11 emerging markets,
33 but only from March 1987 because of data limitations
on other variables in χ .  To more closely replicate previous study and to therefore avoid
capturing temporal out-of-sample bias, the data extend through December 1994.  With 11
cases and 94 times periods, the total number of observations for the panel regressions is 1034.
4.2.  EBA Results: Limited Sample
                                                                                                                                                                           
31 An important alternative perspective suggests that emerging markets in particular could exhibit positive
autocorrelation, which would indicate predictability (Bekaert et al., 1997, p. 17).
32 Notably, these country risk measures might proxy for not only other concurrent reform policies but also for
perceptions of credibility.
33 Given data limitations in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Taiwan is unfortunately not
included in either EBA.  Also, the earliest date for which data are available for all 11 countries and 14 χ
variables is March 1987.  This date notably follows liberalisation according to Henry’s coding for India (June
1986) and the Philippines (May 1986), two cases that nonetheless inform the EBA estimates.  While some
authors (Bekaert and Harvey, 1998; Kim and Singal, 1999) do code liberalisation dates for both countries during
the EBA sample period, the inclusion of markets that did not liberalise would seem to usefully inform estimatesQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 20
In general, EBA suggests that liberalisation is not in fact a robust determinant of stock
market performance.
34  For example, as Table 2A indicates, the 8-month window for
liberalisation does not pass the ‘extreme’ decision rule.
35  With respect to both the 4.55 and
10 percent confidence intervals, the upper and lower bounds have the opposite signs (column
1, rows 1-2, 4-5, respectively), and the coefficient is only significant in approximately 8.52
and 46.63 percent of all (364) M regressions.
36  Also, given elimination of models not within
90 percent of the specification that explains the most variance (following the R
2 decision
rule), only 17.46 percent (row 9) of the coefficients are significant, and the bounds have
opposite signs (rows 7-8).  Finally, while the weighted beta is positive and comparable to
                                                                                                                                                                           
of whether the event affects the dependent variable.  (Perhaps all stock markets should be included in any
analysis of the effect of cross-sectional variance in liberalisation events.)
34 The regression that omits every variable from χ  but controls for world market proxies and country specific
effects suggests that the 8-month liberalisation measure is significant at the 10 percent level.  Specific details on
all underlying models are available on request.
35 For a more complete description of EBA decision rules see Durham (2000b), but the three basic rules used in
this paper are as follows.  The ‘extreme’ decision rule (Levine and Renelt, 1992) essentially states that each t
statistic among the M regressions should be greater than 2 (or 1.645 using the 10 percent confidence interval as
Henry does), and each z coefficient should have the same sign.  A more lenient criterion (Granger and Uhlig,
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36 The 8-month event window is perhaps the most apt to pass a EBA decision rule among the liberalisation
measures.  As Henry (2000a) suggests, the event window perhaps more realistically captures the flow of
information regarding imminent reform.  But a remaining problem is that policymakers are considerably more
inclined to liberalise when market performance is relatively (presumably with respect to temporal variation)
positive, thereby making the empirical link between the event window and returns possibly endogenously
selected.  (Policymakers would not wish to open equity markets and sell shares at ‘fire sale prices’ to foreigners
following periods of poor market performance.)  Seemingly, the longer the event window, the more problematicQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 21
previous estimates at approximately 3.71 percent (Henry, 2000a), the figure only passes the
CDF decision rule under the assumption of weighted normality (row 12).  The weighted non-
normal (row 13) and un-weighted non-normal (row 14) assumptions narrowly miss the
decision rule.
37
The remaining measures of liberalisation using alternative event windows produce
more unequivocally fragile results.  In fact, as all statistics under the extreme and R
2 decision
rules indicate, no liberalisation coefficient is robust controlling for any x set of three χ
factors, even with the 10 percent confidence interval (row 6, columns 2-4).  Of course, all
statistics germane to the CDF decision rule similarly indicate fragility, as the weighted betas,
while positive in support of the hypothesis, are considerably lower than the 8-month window
estimate (3.71 percent) (row 11, columns 2-4).
38
4.3.  EBA Results: Expanded Sample
Unfortunately, previous studies seem with respect to temporal coverage through 1994,
which perhaps notably precludes key crises in emerging markets, including the Tequila Crisis
in Mexico the Asian Flu beginning in 1997.  This section present results from an expanded
sample that includes 5 additional countries from regions beyond Latin American and East
Asia – Greece, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe – and data on all countries through
the end of 1997.  Liberalisation dates for the additional five countries follow Bekaert and
Harvey (1998).  Notably, this panel produces a considerably more powerful test, as the
                                                                                                                                                                           
possible endogenous selection, but the more likely a significant result (in an EBA).  (Indeed, a review of
Henry’s results for alternative windows suggests that the relations are more robust for longer windows.)
37 This study notably does not consider other reforms – with respect to trade, stabilisation, exchange rate
controls, and privatisation – that might occur simultaneously with equity market reform.  This would suggest
that the following EBA is somewhat biased toward positive and robust results for liberalisation.  (Henry’s
precise monthly coding for these other reforms was not made available.)
38 EBA also indicates that post liberalisation effects reported in Table 1A are also sensitive to specification.
Only one regression among the 364 possible models (which include the 8-month liberalisation window in f
along with the MSCI USA, MSCI EAFE, and IFC indices) is significant at the 10 percent level for the measure
that considers the seventh through the twelfth month after liberalisation.  Only 2.2 percent of models for the
variable covering the first year after the event are statistically significant.  Results are available on request.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 22
number of observations more than doubles from 1034 to (16 countries ×  130 months) 2080.
As a result, the EBA also illustrates ‘out-of-sample’ in addition to specification bias vis-à-vis
previous literature.  But nonetheless, an applicable finding should be robust across space,
time, and specification assumptions.
Turning to the results, Table 2B again suggests that liberalisation is not a robust
correlate of stock market returns.
39  For example, the standard 8-month window clearly
passes no decision rule, as the coefficient is significant in only 1.65 percent of the 364
regressions at the 4.55 percent confidence interval and only 22.25 percent at the 10 percent
level.  The R
2 and CDF decision rules similarly indicate fragility.
The alternative 5-month liberalisation window seems more robust, as 4.12 and 46.98
percent of the M coefficients are significant at the 4.55 and 10 percent confidence intervals.
But, the upper and lower bounds have opposite signs, only 1.61 percent of superior models
are significant (row 9, column 2), and CDF statistics narrowly miss the decision rule.
Finally, the 2-month event window and contemporaneous implementation measures are
insignificant in all possible specifications and therefore fail all EBA decision rules.
4.4.  Complete EBA of Anomalies in Emerging Markets
All in all, liberalisation measures are not robust to EBA.  None of the event windows
around reform dates are robust according to any decision rule in either the limited or
expanded panel samples.  But, as previous applications of EBA to financial market anomalies
(Durham, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c) and other econometric issues (Levine and Renelt, 1992;
Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b; Hess et al. 1998) indicates, very few independent variables tend
to pass the extreme decision rule.  While stock market liberalisation indeed fails more lenient
                                                       
39 With respect to the augmented sample, the regression that omits every variable from χ  but controls for world
market proxies and country specific effects suggests that the 8-month liberalisation measure is in only
significant at the 12 percent level.  This suggests that in addition to specification, fragile results are also due to
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EBA tests, the question remains as to whether any other variables in the remaining set of
doubtful variables, χ , are robust.  In other words, how comparatively robust is liberalisation
compared to other purported determinants of stock market returns?  Is EBA too stringent a
test?  Also, in addition to statistical significance and specification, are other variables also
economically significant?
40
Tables 3A and 3B address this issue and summarise the EBA results for all 14
variables in the χ  set for the limited and expanded samples.
41  Similar to the results for
liberalisation summarised in Table 2B, these data suggest that some variables are also fragile
according to all EBA decision rules under identical test conditions.  These variables include
value measures (P/B, P/E, and D/P), inflation volatility, market capitalisation, market
liquidity, and the January effect.
However, in sharp contrast to liberalisation, a number of variables pass at least one
EBA criterion in at least one sample and additionally exhibit economic significance.  For
example, the long-term contrarian proxy is significant in every M specification and therefore
passes the extreme decision rule (and therefore the remaining tests) in both the limited and
more comprehensive sample.  Moreover, the weighted beta from the augmented (limited)
sample of approximately 0.3438 (0.3328) percent listed in Table 3B (Table 3B) has the
expected sign.  Inflation has the expected negative aggregate coefficient and passes the CDF
                                                       
40 Following McCloskey and Ziliak (1996), this section duly notes the size of the weighted betas to address the
distinction between statistical and economic significance, which some applications of EBA neglect given its
explicit emphasis on the former.
41 There are a few key differences between the EBA of emerging markets in Durham (2000a) and the present
study.  First, the augmented sample differs considerably with 2080 versus 1328 panel observations, as this study
includes data from March 1987 through December 1997, while the previous study covers March 1988 through
January 1995.  The number of cases is similarly 16, but this study substitutes data for Portugal with data
covering Jordan.  Second, the previous study includes temporal dummy variables to capture shocks, whereas
this study includes market proxies for the U.S., EAFE, and a LDC (IFC) index, which follows Henry (2000a).
Third, given that the emphasis in this sensitivity analysis is not to capture replicable investment strategies, some
variables enter the current study contemporaneously, including inflation, inflation volatility, country risk,
population demographics, and bank development.  Fourth, the measure for inflation volatility follows Schwert
(1989) rather than the relative change in inflation rates from month to month.  Fifth, the previous study uses
total nominal excess ($U.S.) return on the left-hand-side, while the dependent variable in this study is the total
real gross ($U.S.) return.  While the overall EBA results are similar, these key differences may contribute to the
generally more robust results in this application of EBA.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 24
criterion in both samples, as the weighted beta suggests that a one percent increase in the
monthly inflation rate corresponds with a 0.1351 (0.1985) percent decrease in real monthly
($U.S.) total return in the augmented (limited) sample.
Also, at least with respect to the augmented sample, five other ‘doubtful variables’ are
robust, at least in the augmented sample.  The Institutional Investor country credit rating
narrowly misses the extreme decision rule, but passes the R
2 and CDF criteria with the
expected coefficient.  The weighted coefficient suggests that the difference between the
lowest (Nigeria in March 1996 and March 1997) and highest country credit rating (Korea in
October 1995) implies an approximate 10.332 percent monthly increase in total returns.  Four
other factors pass the CDF decision rule in the augmented sample.  The weighted beta for
momentum suggests that monthly total returns are approximately 0.1398 percent greater.
Also, a one percent increase in the proportion of the population older than 65 suggests a
1.8114 percent decrease in return, and a one percent increases in the ratio of bank credit to
GDP suggests an approximate 4.21 basis point decrease in return.  Finally, the short-term
contrarian proxy is robust to Sala-i-Martin’s test statistic.  The weighted coefficient suggests
that a one percent increase in the previous month’s total return corresponds with an
approximate 6.02 basis point contemporaneous increase, which is inconsistent with the
contrarian hypothesis but corroborates the view of emerging market inefficiency
(predictability).
In general, these results on other (competing) perspectives on stock market
performance suggests that EBA is not an unreasonable econometric criterion on which to
doubt results on stock market liberalisation.  Clearly, especially given the augmented sample,
other factors are robust in identical samples, as seven variables pass EBA tests in at least one
sample.  Also, while assessments as to ‘how large is large’ are ultimately subjective
(McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996), the economic significance of some variables – perhapsQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 25
particularly including long-run lagged returns, inflation, country risk, and population
demographics – seem noteworthy.  Therefore, one might conjecture that specification bias
besets results for liberalisation.
4.5.  Toward identification of problematic specifications
Previous applications of EBA (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b;
Hess et al. 1998; Durham, 2000a) do not discuss particular specifications that produce fragile
results for particular hypotheses of interest.  They simply report the robustness of each
doubtful variable.  But, perhaps some preliminary discussion of key specifications that are
problematic might be instructive for future research.  The fragility of stock market
liberalisation is of course no exception, and therefore this section examines which, if any,
variables in χ  drive insignificant coefficients for liberalisation measures.
Toward that end, Table 4A lists summary statistics for sub sets of the M regressions
from Table 2A by doubtful variable.  For example, row 6 lists 9 statistics for all 78 equations
(among the total 364 models) that include the long-run contrarian proxy.  Row 6, column 2
indicates that of the 78 regressions which include long-run lagged returns, 23.08 percent
produce statistically significant coefficients for the 8-month liberalisation measure at the 10
percent confidence interval.  Given that liberalisation is significant in 46.43 percent of
specifications overall (Table 2A, row 6, column 1), inclusion of this particular doubtful
variable further increases the probability of an insignificant coefficient for liberalisation.
Similarly, column 1 suggests that including inflation volatility (row 8), country risk (row 10),
and relative market size (row 11) are particularly problematic, as only 7.69, 7.69, and 35.9
percent of the regressions produce significant results for liberalisation, respectively.
42
                                                       
42 The average t statistic captures similar information, as the figures for variables that produce no significant
coefficients, inflation volatility and country risk, are the lowest among the 14 factors at approximately 1.46 and
1.44, respectively.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 26
Also, Table 4A indicates which particular specifications produce the extreme bounds.
For example, the model that includes the long-run contrarian proxy, inflation volatility, and
country risk in the x set produces the lower bound (column 3), and the equation that includes
inflation, turnover, and bank development produces the upper bound (column 4).  Perhaps
also instructive, Table 4A also shows which model among the 364 regressions has the best
overall fit, as the model that includes the long-run contrarian proxy, inflation, and inflation
volatility has an R
2 value of 0.1302.  Notably, liberalisation is not significant in this particular
regression within any standard confidence interval, with a t statistic of only 1.388.
43
The expanded panel sample produces similar results.  For example, variables that are
particularly problematic for the 8-month window measures include the long-run contrarian
proxy (12.82 percent significant at the 10 percent confidence interval – Table 4B, row 6,
column 2), inflation volatility (1.28 percent), population demographics (0.00 percent),
country risk (0.00 percent), and relative market size (10.26 percent).   Also, the model among
the 364 M regressions with the best fit includes long-run lagged returns, inflation, and
country risk, and notably, the 8-month widow has the expected positive sign, but the
parameter is insignificant with a t statistic of 1.251.
44  Finally, as Table 4C indicates, the
same five variables similarly seem to increase the probability of fragile results for the 5-
month window, and the best model again produces an insignificant result for liberalisation (t
statistic of 1.34).
45
Therefore, while liberalisation is largely fragile according to EBA inference criteria,
this examination of subsets of M regressions by (competing) doubtful variable indicate that
some factors seem to increase the probability of insignificant results.  Perhaps future research
                                                       
43 Long-run lagged returns and inflation significantly enter the equation with the expected negative signs and t
statistics of 2.656 and 2.547, respectively.  Inflation volatility is unexpectedly positive, with a t statistic of
1.935.  Further particulars on all M regressions are available on request.
44 In this particular model, each variable included in x is statistically significant with the expected sign, and the
R
2 value is 0.094 (Table 4B; rows 6, 7, 10; column 9).QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 27
should consider particular variables such as inflation, long-run lagged returns, country risk
measures, and relative market size.
4.6. Time-Series EBA
Several factors recommend supplementing panel regressions with time-series analysis
of individual countries.  In addition to isolating the general importance of spatial and
temporal variance, time-series analysis ameliorate problems in defining concepts across
different markets, as variables such as accounting measures or, particularly given this
research question, liberalisation.  Again, as Table 1C indicates, definitions of the event in
question are highly contentious, and the results are very sensitive to definitional changes.
Given the fragility outlined in the previous section, time-series EBA is also
instructive, and Table 5A summarises the results for 14 countries from the expanded panel
sample that covers March 1987 through December 1997.  Notably, few time-series results
support the liberalisation hypothesis, as data from only two countries are robust according to
any decision rule with the expected sign.  Data for Colombia do unequivocally suggest that
liberalisation leads to higher real returns, as the variable is clearly robust according to the
most extreme decision rule with a weighted beta that implies approximately 10.36 percent
greater returns on average during the 8-month event window.  Also, some data for Argentina
support the hypothesis, as the coefficient suggests 18.35 percent greater returns given
liberalisation, which passes the R
2 and CDF but not the extreme decision rule.
46
But the remaining 12 cases clearly do not support the hypothesis.  In fact, data for
Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and Venezuela, all suggests that temporal
variation in liberalisation is fragile.  Also, countries notably excluded from previous samples
                                                                                                                                                                           
45 Similar to the results for the 8-month window in the expanded panel sample, the equation that includes the
long-run contrarian proxy, inflation, and country risk produces the greatest overall fit, as each factor is safely
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(Henry, 2000b) – Greece, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe – all indicate that
liberalisation does not pass any EBA decision rule.  Perhaps most problematic, however, data
for Chile actually indicate a negative effect on returns during the 8-month window, which is
robust at least according to the CDF decision rule.
5.  Conclusions
The recently reported positive association between equity market liberalisation, stock
prices (the decrease in k), and private investment has profound implications for lower income
countries.  Assuming robust empirical relations to support this transmission mechanism,
(nascent) emerging stock markets should allow foreigners to purchases domestic shares, and
policymakers can expect price appreciation and increased private investment.  In some
respects, this paper suggests that previous evidence is robust to controversies in the literature
on international capital flows.  That is, at least with respect to the first chain in the
mechanism, liberalisation seems to lead to sustainable increases in equity price levels given
models that include post-liberalisation dummy variables – booms do not seem to be followed
by busts.  Also, the effect of liberalisation on prices seems independent from its effect on
market volatility, which does not seem to affect performance.
But unfortunately, other sensitivity analyses cast doubt on the benevolent relation.
For example, the event study methodology on which these findings are based ultimately rests
on subjective assessments of when ‘liberalisation’ exactly occurs.  Indeed, this paper shows
that previous results are extremely sensitive to alternative sets of event assumptions.  Also,
even using coding that produces significant results, it seems that spatial as opposed to
temporal variance seems to drive previous findings from panel regressions, as only data from
only one country, Colombia, suggests a statistically significant result within the 5 percent
                                                                                                                                                                           
46 Table 5B1 indicates that liberalisation would pass the extreme decision rule using data for Argentina if only
P/E, inflation, inflation volatility, and bank development were included in the x set.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 29
confidence interval.  Briefly, while spatial variance is in fact relevant to the general question
of whether liberalisation effects prices, it seems less relevant to this particular transition
mechanism from local market price appreciation to private investment growth.
Moreover, event definitions and spatial variance aside, liberalisation is not the only
purported determinant of stock market performance according to the empirical finance
literature.  In fact, EBA analysis indicates that the hypothesis is not robust to alternative
specifications.  Notably, while EBA is a rigorous exercise, this paper nonetheless shows that
some variables are in fact robust to various decision rules, which suggests that liberalisation
is comparatively fragile.  Perhaps useful for future empirical research and theory, inclusion of
a few particular variables – the long-run contrarian proxy, inflation volatility, population
demographics, country risk measures, and relative market capitalisation – seem to increase
the probability that liberalisation is statistically fragile.
Therefore, the statistical relation between liberalisation and stock market performance
is perhaps not as lucid as previous studies suggest.  This implies that the grand transmission
mechanism from reform to private investment growth is empirically tenuous, especially if
liberalisation has no direct effect on private investment in addition to its purported gross
effect through valuation.  While the evidence in this paper does uncover robust negative
effects, the short-run policy implications of stock market liberalisation seem unclear.
Two questions remain with respect to interpretation, particularly with respect to
policy.  First, given persuasive theory, ambiguous results require some explanation.
Therefore, to briefly proffer a possible interpretation, as other economists discuss in detail,
policymaker credibility could be critical in this regard.  Under textbook conditions
policymakers are fully committed to reform and market participants have perfect information
through the announcement, and this reform scenario should produce a one-time decrease in k
and increase in stock market prices.  But, if the market does not consider reformQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 30
pronouncements as credible, prices are unlikely to respond accordingly, all things being
equal, and indeed, the use of event windows in previous studies seems to accommodate
market imperfections by definition.  Therefore, ambiguous results given more fully specified
models of asset returns might reflect market participants’ perception of reform credibility and
commitment.
47  Simply, equity markets may not judge policy as credible, and reform
announcements therefore have no robust measurable effect on prices.
48
Second, general conclusions from the evidence in this paper regarding the real effects
of stock markets in lower income countries can only be drawn with considerable trepidation,
as this study only address the first phase in the short-run mechanism.  However, some data
suggest that liberalisation does not directly affect private investment, controlling for several
factors in the literature as well as contemporaneous and lagged valuation changes (Durham,
2000d).  Also, some long-run data suggest that the correlation between stock market
development and economic growth only holds for higher income country samples (Durham,
2000d), which casts doubt on the second phase of the long-run mechanism from reform to
expansion.   But these issues aside, which are far beyond the scope of this paper, the relation
between liberalisation and market returns seems questionable, and therefore lower income
countries should proceed cautiously with reform.
                                                       
47 Perhaps the comparatively robust findings for inflation according to the CDF EBA decision rule in both the
limited and expanded samples is germane to policy credibility – markets seem to react favourably to lower
inflation.
48 Some intervening factors might be relevant.  For example, it might be instructive to explicitly consider the
electoral cycle – markets might judge policy announcements before competitive elections as less credible.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 31
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Table 1A: Post Liberalisation Event Windows
Augmented ‘Baseline’ panel regressions




Post Event window window
Window (months) β t score β t score R
2 Obs.
(1) 1 to 6 0.0151 0.8829 0.0318 2.1015 0.0968 2119
(2) 7 to 12 * 0.0308 1.8171 0.0322 2.1400 0.0979 2119
(3) 13 to 18 0.0070 0.4123 0.0313 2.0809 0.0964 2119
(4) 19 to 24 0.0084 0.4928 0.0314 2.0855 0.0964 2119
(5) 25 to 30 0.0226 1.3317 0.0319 2.1192 0.0971 2119
(6) 31 to 36 -0.0231 -1.3519 0.0303 2.0048 0.0970 2119
(7) 37 to 42 0.0014 0.0779 0.0311 2.0657 0.0963 2119
(8) 43 to 48 -0.0017 -0.0947 0.0310 2.0578 0.0963 2119
(9) 1 to 8 0.0241 1.5985 0.0326 2.1509 0.0976 2119
(10) 9 to 16 0.0109 0.7181 0.0316 2.0970 0.0965 2119
(11) 17 to 24 0.0128 0.8566 0.0317 2.1079 0.0967 2119
(12) 25 to 32 -0.0037 -0.2485 0.0309 2.0500 0.0963 2119
(13) 33 to 40 0.0094 0.6161 0.0315 2.0895 0.0965 2119
(14) 41 to 48 -0.0059 -0.3822 0.0308 2.0439 0.0964 2119
(15) 1 to 12 ** 0.0255 2.0142 0.0333 2.1975 0.0984 2119
(16) 13 to 24 0.0083 0.6531 0.0317 2.1036 0.0965 2119
(17) 25 to 36 0.0000 0.0010 0.0311 2.0594 0.0963 2119
(18) 37 to 48 -0.0001 -0.0113 0.0311 2.0592 0.0963 2119
(19) 1 to 6 0.0196 1.1410 0.0346 2.2698 0.1005 2119
7 to 12 ** 0.0342 1.9905
13 to 18 0.0109 0.6363
19 to 24 0.0125 0.7224
25 to 30 0.0245 1.4268
31 to 36 -0.0185 -1.0677
37 to 42 0.0041 0.2273
43 to 48 0.0008 0.0439
(20) 1 to 8 * 0.0267 1.7534 0.0347 2.2749 0.0989 2119
9 to 16 0.0151 0.9861
17 to 24 0.0157 1.0337
25 to 32 -0.0001 -0.0095
33 to 40 0.0120 0.7750
41 to 48 -0.0027 -0.1741
(21) 1 to 12 ** 0.0271 2.1152 0.0347 2.2740 0.0988 2119
13 to 24 0.0114 0.8849
25 to 36 0.0033 0.2542
37 to 48 0.0028 0.2083
* Significant within the 10 percent confidence interval.
** Significant within the 5 percent confidence interval.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 36
Table 1B: Volatility (Absolute Risk), Liberalisation, and Real Total Returns




Dependent Volatility Volatility window window
Sample Variable β t score β t score R
2 Obs.
(1) Total Panel Sample ** Volatility 0.0190 2.1570 0.4963 1296
(2) Argentina ** Volatility 0.2506 5.7576 0.2383 108
(3) Brazil Volatility -0.0049 -0.1108 0.0001 108
(4) Chile Volatility -0.0048 -0.3646 0.0030 108
(5) Colombia Volatility 0.0235 1.2923 0.0176 108
(6) India Volatility 0.0107 0.3897 0.0074 108
(7) Korea Volatility -0.0035 -0.2367 0.0024 108
(8) Malaysia * Volatility 0.0281 1.6607 0.0254 108
(9) Mexico Volatility 0.0062 0.1533 0.0000 108
(10) Philippines Volatility 0.0040 0.1407 0.0002 108
(11) Taiwan Volatility -0.0750 -1.5589 0.0188 108
(12) Thailand * Volatility 0.0591 2.4740 0.0532 108
(13) Venezuela Volatility -0.0432 -1.4025 0.0163 108
(14) Argentina † Real Total Return 0.2649 1.8467 0.0870 108
(15) Brazil Real Total Return -0.2470 -1.5912 0.1950 108
(16) Chile Real Total Return 0.0244 0.1442 0.2200 108
(17) Colombia Real Total Return 0.0692 0.4272 0.0399 108
(18) India Real Total Return 0.1783 0.9822 0.0480 108
(19) Korea †† Real Total Return 0.3533 1.9795 0.1921 108
(20) Malaysia Real Total Return -0.1063 -0.7677 0.4222 108
(21) Mexico †† Real Total Return -0.7293 -5.1020 0.4543 108
(22) Philippines Real Total Return 0.1317 0.8725 0.1175 108
(23) Taiwan Real Total Return 0.0551 0.5557 0.6682 108
(24) Thailand Real Total Return 0.0143 0.1043 0.3255 108
(25) Venezuela Real Total Return -0.0671 -0.4102 0.0186 108
(26) Total Panel Sample Real Total Return -0.0280 -0.4707 0.1161 1296
(27) Total Panel Sample ** Real Total Return -0.0402 -0.6798 0.0354 2.2574 0.1206 1296
* Liberalisation Significant within the 10 percent confidence interval.
** Liberalisation Significant within the 5 percent confidence interval.
† Volatility Significant within the 10 percent confidence interval.
†† Volatility Significant within the 5 percent confidence interval.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 37
Table 1C: Sensitivity Analysis of Alternative Liberalisation Dates (Various Authors)
‘Baseline’ Panel Regressions
(7 countries from 1/76 to 12/94, 5 countries from 1/85 to 12/94)
8-month event window: β t score R
2 Obs.
(1) Henry (2000a) ** 0.0311 2.0640 0.0963 2119
(2) Henry (2000a) “unique dates”  ** 0.0228 2.1615 0.0966 2119
(3) Bekaert and Harvey (1998) 0.0054 0.3521 0.0940 2119
(4) Kim and Singal (1999) 0.0101 0.6404 0.0942 2119
(5) Levine and Zervos (1998) -0.0091 -0.5919 0.0940 2119
5-month event window:
(6) Henry (2000a) ** 0.0077 0.4132 0.0941 2119
(7) Henry (2000a) “unique dates”  ** 0.0219 1.7447 0.0957 2119
(8) Bekaert and Harvey (1998) 0.0010 0.0521 0.0939 2119
(9) Kim and Singal (1999) 0.0057 0.2930 0.0940 2119
(10) Levine and Zervos (1998) -0.0165 -0.8686 0.0943 2119
2-month event window:
(11) Henry (2000a) ** 0.0065 0.2392 0.0940 2119
(12) Henry (2000a) “unique dates”  ** 0.0216 1.2206 0.0948 2119
(13) Bekaert and Harvey (1998) -0.0166 -0.6032 0.0941 2119
(14) Kim and Singal (1999) -0.0102 -0.3630 0.0939 2119
(15) Levine and Zervos (1998) -0.0202 -0.7314 0.0941 2119
Implementation month:
(16) Henry (2000a) ** 0.0184 0.5189 0.0941 2119
(17) Henry (2000a) “unique dates”  ** 0.0378 1.7050 0.0954 2119
(18) Bekaert and Harvey (1998) -0.0127 -0.3564 0.0940 2119
(19) Kim and Singal (1999) -0.0070 -0.1926 0.0939 2119
(20) Levine and Zervos (1998) -0.0065 -0.1844 0.0939 2119
* Significant within the 10 percent confidence interval.
** Significant within the 5 percent confidence interval.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 38
Table 1D: Individual Time-Series Regressions (‘Baseline’ Panel)
12 Emerging Markets (Henry [2000a] sample)
December 1976 to December 1994
Prais-
Winsten
Sample β t score R
2 DW Obs.
(1) Total Panel Sample ** 0.0311 2.0640 0.0963 NA 2119
(2) Argentina 0.1070 1.4157 0.0606 2.0123 217
(3) Brazil 0.0214 0.4096 0.2174 1.9932 217
(4) Chile -0.0053 -0.1343 0.0964 2.0394 217
(5) India 0.0219 0.7083 0.0152 1.9771 217
(6) Korea 0.0101 0.3308 0.0825 1.9941 217
(7) Mexico -0.0098 -0.2052 0.2229 1.9391 217
(8) Thailand 0.0212 0.7344 0.1724 2.0239 217
(9) †Colombia ** 0.0987 2.4912 0.0793 1.9487 120
(10) †Malayisa * 0.0398 1.6755 0.3798 2.0005 120
(11) †Philippines 0.0093 0.2173 0.1115 1.9416 120
(12) †Taiwan 0.0216 0.5336 0.6363 1.9115 120
(13) †Venezuela -0.0244 -0.4289 0.0066 2.0314 120
† Total return data from IFC available beginning January 1985.
* Significant within the 10 percent confidence interval.
** Significant within the 5 percent confidence interval.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 39
Table 2A: Panel EBA
Stock Market Liberalisation Events
14 Factors ∈   χ , 11 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1994
(Regressions per Factor = 364, Observations per Regression = 1034)
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Liberalise Liberalise Liberalise Liberalise
(8-month (5-month (2-month (No
window) window) window) window)
Extreme Decision Rule (Levine and Renelt, 1992)
(4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000)
(1) Lower Bound -0.0218 -0.0512 -0.0544 -0.0746
(2) Upper Bound 0.0961 0.0721 0.0957 0.1122
(3) Fraction Significant 8.52% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Extreme Decision Rule (Levine and Renelt, 1992)
(10.00% Confidence Interval, t=1.645)
(4) Lower Bound -0.0139 -0.0423 -0.0429 -0.0597
(5) Upper Bound 0.0883 0.0633 0.0842 0.0973
(6) Fraction Significant 46.43% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
R
2 Decision Rule (Granger and Uhlig, 1990)
(4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000)
(7) Granger Lower Bound -0.0218 -0.0512 -0.0544 -0.0746
(8) Granger Upper Bound 0.0961 0.0669 0.0904 0.1120
(9) Granger Fraction Significant 17.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(10) M Models Eliminated 82.69% 89.01% 89.01% 89.56%
CDF Decision Rule (Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b)
(11) Weighted Beta 0.0371 0.0130 0.0244 0.0218
(12) Weighted Normal CDF 0.9501 0.6978 0.7720 0.6978
(13) Weighted Non-Normal CDF 0.9457 0.6955 0.7709 0.6972
(14) Non-Weighted Non-Normal CDF 0.9457 0.6960 0.7716 0.6977QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 40
Table 2B: Panel EBA
Stock Market Liberalisation Events
14 Factors, 16 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1997
(Regressions per Factor = 364, Observations per Regression = 2080)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Liberalise Liberalise Liberalise Liberalise
(8-month (5-month (2-month (No
window) window) window) window)
Extreme Decision Rule (Levine and Renelt, 1992)
(4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000)
(1) Lower Bound -0.0194 -0.0172 -0.0311 -0.0432
(2) Upper Bound 0.0626 0.0735 0.0811 0.0936
(3) Fraction Significant 1.65% 4.12% 0.00% 0.00%
Extreme Decision Rule (Levine and Renelt, 1992)
(10.00% Confidence Interval, t=1.645)
(4) Lower Bound -0.0139 -0.0108 -0.0225 -0.0325
(5) Upper Bound 0.0572 0.0672 0.0725 0.0828
(6) Fraction Significant 22.25% 46.98% 0.00% 0.00%
R
2 Decision Rule (Granger and Uhlig, 1990)
(4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000)
(7) Granger Lower Bound -0.0194 -0.0172 -0.0311 -0.0432
(8) Granger Upper Bound 0.0592 0.0702 0.0786 0.0926
(9) Granger Fraction Significant 1.82% 1.61% 0.00% 0.00%
(10) M Models Eliminated 84.89% 82.97% 84.62% 85.99%
CDF Decision Rule (Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b)
(11) Weighted Beta 0.0213 0.0287 0.0270 0.0270
(12) Weighted Normal CDF 0.9215 0.9471 0.8684 0.8151
(13) Weighted Non-Normal CDF 0.9138 0.9425 0.8660 0.8136
(14) Non-Weighted Non-Normal CDF 0.9141 0.9427 0.8666 0.8144QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 41
Table 3A: Panel EBA
14 Doubtful Variables
14 Factors ∈   χ  (including Liberalise, 8-month window), 11 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1994
M Regressions = 364, Observations per Regression = 1034
Extreme Decision Rule Extreme Decision Rule R
2 Decision Rule CDF Decision Rule
(Levine and Renelt, 1992) (Levine and Renelt, 1992) (Granger and Uhlig, 1990) (Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b)
(4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000) (10.00% Confidence Interval, t=1.645) (4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Granger Granger Granger Weighted Weighted Un-Weighted
Lower Upper Fraction Lower Upper Fraction Lower Upper Fraction M Models Weighted Normal Non-Normal Non-Normal
Doubtful Variable Bound Bound Significant Bound Bound Significant Bound Bound Significant Eliminated Beta CDF CDF CDF
Price to Book -0.0065 0.0030 0.00% -0.0059 0.0023 0.00% -0.0065 0.0030 0.00% 86.81% -0.0017 0.8240 0.8194 0.8200
Price to Earnings -0.0003 0.0001 0.00% -0.0003 0.0001 0.00% -0.0003 0.0001 0.00% 85.99% -0.0001 0.7807 0.7782 0.7785
Dividend Yield -0.0095 0.0054 0.00% -0.0084 0.0042 0.00% -0.0095 0.0048 0.00% 85.16% -0.0019 0.7380 0.7350 0.7348
Short-term Contrarian Proxy -0.0746 0.1195 0.00% -0.0596 0.1045 0.00% -0.0746 0.1184 0.00% 89.56% 0.0251 0.7227 0.7211 0.7222
Momentum Proxy -0.2198 0.3472 0.00% -0.1834 0.3112 0.00% -0.2198 0.3472 0.00% 87.64% 0.0652 0.7397 0.7312 0.7311
Long-term Contrarian Proxy -0.6411 -0.0379 100.00% -0.5935 -0.0842 100.00% -0.6411 -0.0381 100.00% 87.91% -0.3328 0.9936 0.9934 0.9933
Inflation -0.5493 0.0383 46.15% -0.5090 0.0057 94.78% -0.5493 0.0205 79.52% 77.20% -0.1985 0.9807 0.9751 0.9748
Inflation Volatility -0.3580 1.1488 13.19% -0.2733 1.0524 21.43% -0.0698 1.1488 62.75% 85.99% 0.2866 0.8757 0.8424 0.8389
Population > 65 -8.4993 8.6996 0.00% -7.6020 7.6980 0.00% -8.4993 8.0082 0.00% 90.11% -0.1369 0.5219 0.6747 0.6729
Institutional Investor Country Risk -0.0055 0.0016 15.93% -0.0050 0.0011 36.54% -0.0053 0.0002 91.30% 93.68% -0.0018 0.9428 0.9325 0.9314
Market Capitalisation (% GDP) -0.0807 0.0559 3.02% -0.0741 0.0473 15.66% -0.0742 0.0559 6.25% 86.81% -0.0158 0.8443 0.8376 0.8371
Turnover -0.2329 0.0983 0.00% -0.2095 0.0736 0.00% -0.2329 0.0874 0.00% 87.09% -0.0597 0.8168 0.8132 0.8122
Bank Development -0.1025 0.1646 0.00% -0.0873 0.1489 0.27% -0.0873 0.1646 0.00% 89.56% 0.0080 0.5847 0.6385 0.6345
January -0.0340 0.0295 0.00% -0.0291 0.0246 0.00% -0.0329 0.0295 0.00% 85.71% -0.0038 0.6090 0.6109 0.6118QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 42
Table 3B: Panel EBA
14 Doubtful Variables
14 Factors ∈   χ  (including Liberalise, 8-month window), 16 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1997
M Regressions = 364, Observations per Regression = 2080
Extreme Decision Rule Extreme Decision Rule R
2 Decision Rule CDF Decision Rule
(Levine and Renelt, 1992) (Levine and Renelt, 1992) (Granger and Uhlig, 1990) (Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b)
(4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000) (10.00% Confidence Interval, t=1.645) (4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Granger Granger Granger Weighted Weighted Un-Weighted
Lower Upper Fraction Lower Upper Fraction Lower Upper Fraction M Models Weighted Normal Non-Normal Non-Normal
Doubtful Variable Bound Bound Significant Bound Bound Significant Bound Bound Significant Eliminated Beta CDF CDF CDF
Price to Book -0.0067 0.0030 0.00% -0.0061 0.0024 3.02% -0.0060 0.0029 0.00% 84.34% -0.0018 0.8625 0.8517 0.8530
Price to Earnings -0.0003 0.0001 0.00% -0.0002 0.0001 0.00% -0.0003 0.0001 0.00% 83.52% -0.0001 0.8253 0.8228 0.8231
Dividend Yield -0.0049 0.0042 0.00% -0.0043 0.0036 0.00% -0.0047 0.0041 0.00% 87.64% -0.0004 0.5927 0.6217 0.6216
Short-term Contrarian Proxy -0.0143 0.1260 77.20% -0.0043 0.1159 99.18% -0.0143 0.1194 18.75% 82.42% 0.0603 0.9830 0.9815 0.9818
Momentum Proxy -0.0595 0.3299 50.27% -0.0340 0.3042 91.21% -0.0595 0.3020 20.31% 82.42% 0.1398 0.9755 0.9711 0.9715
Long-term Contrarian Proxy -0.5862 -0.1049 100.00% -0.5521 -0.1373 100.00% -0.5862 -0.1102 100.00% 70.05% -0.3428 0.9999 0.9998 0.9998
Inflation -0.4010 0.1032 39.01% -0.3747 0.0770 72.80% -0.4010 0.0954 72.22% 90.11% -0.1351 0.9734 0.9524 0.9513
Inflation Volatility -0.2995 0.8904 13.74% -0.2348 0.8175 21.70% -0.2602 0.8904 43.48% 93.68% 0.2224 0.8823 0.8466 0.8447
Population > 65 -4.8417 1.0516 58.24% -4.5352 0.7439 77.47% -4.8417 0.5811 80.00% 80.77% -1.8114 0.9839 0.9632 0.9625
Institutional Investor Country Risk -0.0041 0.0004 92.03% -0.0039 0.0001 98.90% -0.0041 -0.0003 100.00% 84.89% -0.0018 0.9976 0.9931 0.9928
Market Capitalisation (% GDP) -0.0825 0.0470 62.91% -0.0768 0.0413 74.18% -0.0825 0.0470 64.29% 76.92% -0.0310 0.9797 0.9450 0.9458
Turnover -0.2508 0.0486 1.37% -0.2286 0.0280 31.87% -0.2508 0.0415 6.67% 87.64% -0.0956 0.9426 0.9398 0.9396
Bank Development -0.0991 0.0369 65.66% -0.0918 0.0282 78.57% -0.0991 0.0173 85.42% 86.81% -0.0421 0.9805 0.9652 0.9646
January -0.0251 0.0189 0.00% -0.0214 0.0152 0.00% -0.0248 0.0188 0.00% 85.44% -0.0032 0.6230 0.6229 0.6230QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 43
Table 4A: Subsets of M EBA Regressions by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
11 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 6.41% 50.00% -0.0175 0.0931 0.0374 1.6632 0.1111 0.1070 0.1224
(2) Price-to-Earnings 8.97% 69.23% -0.0153 0.0938 0.0389 1.7358 0.1122 0.1085 0.1233
(3) Dividend Yield 8.97% 65.38% -0.0159 0.0952 0.0387 1.7162 0.1116 0.1078 0.1231
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 6.41% 41.03% -0.0184 0.0918 0.0364 1.6265 0.1118 0.1083 0.1228
(5) Momentum Proxy 12.82% 66.67% -0.0169 0.0948 0.0388 1.7369 0.1115 0.1077 0.1234
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 2.56% 23.08% -0.0218 0.0900 0.0341 1.5144 0.1180 0.1156 0.1302
(7) Inflation 39.74% 80.77% -0.0183 0.0961 0.0423 1.9081 0.1182 0.1135 0.1302
(8) Inflation Volatility 0.00% 7.69% -0.0218 0.0826 0.0321 1.4563 0.1124 0.1075 0.1302
(9) Population > 65 2.56% 46.15% -0.0185 0.0936 0.0381 1.6314 0.1108 0.1069 0.1224
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 0.00% 7.69% -0.0218 0.0873 0.0330 1.4394 0.1120 0.1078 0.1260
(11) Market Size (Relative) 2.56% 35.90% -0.0179 0.0917 0.0362 1.5906 0.1106 0.1068 0.1221
(12) Turnover 8.97% 57.69% -0.0170 0.0961 0.0384 1.6960 0.1113 0.1072 0.1234
(13) Bank Development 12.82% 51.28% -0.0184 0.0961 0.0379 1.6802 0.1111 0.1068 0.1256
(14) January 6.41% 47.44% -0.0181 0.0930 0.0371 1.6455 0.1107 0.1068 0.1222QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 44
Table 4B: Subsets of M EBA Regressions by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
16 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 1.28% 24.36% -0.0163 0.0608 0.0220 1.4525 0.0783 0.0730 0.0875
(2) Price-to-Earnings 1.28% 37.18% -0.0147 0.0616 0.0232 1.5341 0.0789 0.0737 0.0883
(3) Dividend Yield 1.28% 25.64% -0.0160 0.0607 0.0223 1.4728 0.0780 0.0729 0.0877
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 1.28% 24.36% -0.0157 0.0582 0.0212 1.4560 0.0828 0.0784 0.0918
(5) Momentum Proxy 7.69% 42.31% -0.0139 0.0626 0.0239 1.5926 0.0807 0.0756 0.0887
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 0.00% 12.82% -0.0194 0.0592 0.0204 1.3526 0.0858 0.0815 0.0940
(7) Inflation 7.69% 57.69% -0.0138 0.0626 0.0252 1.6721 0.0810 0.0750 0.0940
(8) Inflation Volatility 0.00% 1.28% -0.0186 0.0555 0.0192 1.2861 0.0790 0.0729 0.0883
(9) Population > 65 0.00% 0.00% -0.0194 0.0556 0.0178 1.1567 0.0794 0.0742 0.0893
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 0.00% 0.00% -0.0194 0.0542 0.0174 1.1508 0.0815 0.0768 0.0940
(11) Market Size (Relative) 0.00% 10.26% -0.0174 0.0583 0.0206 1.3537 0.0793 0.0748 0.0886
(12) Turnover 1.28% 26.92% -0.0154 0.0626 0.0229 1.5100 0.0789 0.0736 0.0886
(13) Bank Development 0.00% 23.08% -0.0174 0.0590 0.0212 1.4103 0.0807 0.0757 0.0923
(14) January 1.28% 25.64% -0.0163 0.0611 0.0221 1.4611 0.0780 0.0729 0.0874QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 45
Table 4C: Subsets of M EBA Regressions  by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (5-month window)
16 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 3.85% 56.41% -0.0134 0.0721 0.0298 1.6767 0.0787 0.0733 0.0879
(2) Price-to-Earnings 10.26% 66.67% -0.0116 0.0730 0.0311 1.7554 0.0793 0.0740 0.0887
(3) Dividend Yield 2.56% 55.13% -0.0136 0.0716 0.0295 1.6572 0.0783 0.0733 0.0880
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 5.13% 61.54% -0.0127 0.0696 0.0291 1.6952 0.0832 0.0789 0.0923
(5) Momentum Proxy 10.26% 66.67% -0.0120 0.0735 0.0309 1.7464 0.0809 0.0758 0.0891
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 0.00% 47.44% -0.0172 0.0702 0.0279 1.5763 0.0862 0.0818 0.0942
(7) Inflation 16.67% 67.95% -0.0140 0.0735 0.0312 1.7569 0.0812 0.0751 0.0942
(8) Inflation Volatility 0.00% 32.05% -0.0156 0.0672 0.0268 1.5200 0.0794 0.0733 0.0886
(9) Population > 65 0.00% 2.56% -0.0172 0.0659 0.0251 1.4035 0.0798 0.0746 0.0898
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 0.00% 0.00% -0.0172 0.0639 0.0242 1.3652 0.0819 0.0771 0.0942
(11) Market Size (Relative) 0.00% 30.77% -0.0151 0.0685 0.0275 1.5394 0.0796 0.0752 0.0891
(12) Turnover 6.41% 61.54% -0.0128 0.0735 0.0305 1.7107 0.0793 0.0739 0.0889
(13) Bank Development 0.00% 52.56% -0.0150 0.0701 0.0288 1.6288 0.0810 0.0759 0.0927
(14) January 2.56% 56.41% -0.0139 0.0717 0.0294 1.6538 0.0783 0.0733 0.0878QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 46
Table 5A: Time-Series EBA
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
14 Factors ∈   χ , 16 Emerging Markets, March 1987 to December 1997
M Regressions = 364, Observations per Regression = 130
Extreme Decision Rule Extreme Decision Rule R
2 Decision Rule CDF Decision Rule
(Levine and Renelt, 1992) (Levine and Renelt, 1992) (Granger and Uhlig, 1990) (Sala-i-Martin, 1997a, 1997b)
(4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000) (10.00% Confidence Interval, t=1.645) (4.55% Confidence Interval, t=2.000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Granger Granger Granger Weighted Weighted Un-Weighted
Lower Upper Fraction Lower Upper Fraction Lower Upper Fraction M Models Weighted Normal Non-Normal Non-Normal
Country Bound Bound Significant Bound Bound Significant Bound Bound Significant Eliminated Beta CDF CDF CDF
Argentina -0.0462 0.5149 68.41% -0.0207 0.4762 89.01% 0.0521 0.4380 100.00% 98.63% 0.1835 0.9901 0.9818 0.9805
Brazil -0.1529 0.2119 0.00% -0.1333 0.1897 0.00% -0.1302 0.1776 0.00% 97.53% 0.0233 0.6624 0.6769 0.6764
Chile -0.1958 0.0426 1.37% -0.1792 0.0256 62.91% -0.1528 0.0275 0.00% 79.67% -0.0702 0.9531 0.9502 0.9502
Colombia 0.0134 0.2047 100.00% 0.0277 0.1903 100.00% 0.0293 0.1507 100.00% 87.09% 0.1036 0.9991 0.9989 0.9986
Korea -0.1742 0.1538 0.00% -0.1548 0.1336 0.00% -0.1095 0.0689 0.00% 97.80% -0.0072 0.5604 0.6328 0.6333
Malaysia -0.1016 0.1525 0.00% -0.0855 0.1333 0.00% -0.0701 0.1115 0.00% 89.84% 0.0097 0.5855 0.5973 0.5958
Mexico -0.2039 0.0911 0.00% -0.1846 0.0734 2.75% -0.1407 0.0641 0.00% 78.57% -0.0380 0.7885 0.7705 0.7677
Thailand -0.1026 0.1772 3.85% -0.0866 0.1635 10.71% -0.1026 0.1428 5.97% 81.59% 0.0301 0.8019 0.7689 0.7754
Venezuela -0.2660 0.1325 0.82% -0.2478 0.1068 2.20% -0.1323 0.0591 0.00% 93.96% -0.0340 0.7730 0.7403 0.7394
Greece -0.0717 0.2352 12.64% -0.0532 0.2180 40.66% -0.0590 0.1378 2.27% 87.91% 0.0593 0.9343 0.9107 0.9231
Jordan -0.0449 0.0461 0.00% -0.0392 0.0400 0.00% -0.0301 0.0382 0.00% 99.45% 0.0000 0.5000 0.5756 0.5750
Nigeria -0.2574 0.1430 0.00% -0.2343 0.1196 1.92% -0.2447 0.0290 0.00% 99.45% -0.0607 0.8366 0.8185 0.8257
Pakistan -0.1053 0.0727 0.00% -0.0927 0.0607 0.00% -0.1038 0.0218 0.00% 99.73% -0.0134 0.6563 0.6590 0.6447
Zimbabwe -0.2618 0.0769 16.48% -0.2435 0.0584 27.20% -0.1276 0.0612 0.00% 82.97% -0.0449 0.8821 0.7751 0.8511QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 47
Table 5B1: Subsets of M EBA Time-Series Regressions (Table 5A, Argentina) by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
Argentina, March 1987 to December 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 80.77% 93.59% -0.0462 0.5149 0.2133 2.3550 0.1141 0.0924 0.1443
(2) Price-to-Earnings 98.72% 100.00% -0.0296 0.4773 0.2065 2.5932 0.1254 0.1055 0.1660
(3) Dividend Yield 60.26% 91.03% -0.0357 0.4540 0.1604 2.1453 0.1153 0.0901 0.1532
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 64.10% 85.90% -0.0404 0.4876 0.1741 2.1911 0.1072 0.0817 0.1437
(5) Momentum Proxy 52.56% 78.21% -0.0432 0.4669 0.1586 2.0969 0.1094 0.0817 0.1475
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 58.97% 92.31% -0.0362 0.4739 0.1648 2.2176 0.1233 0.0979 0.1790
(7) Inflation 98.72% 100.00% -0.0048 0.4933 0.2168 2.6842 0.1306 0.1089 0.1640
(8) Inflation Volatility 76.92% 100.00% -0.0137 0.5149 0.2071 2.1772 0.1112 0.0890 0.1527
(9) Population > 65 56.41% 94.87% -0.0329 0.4656 0.1696 2.2008 0.1127 0.0817 0.1596
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 50.00% 78.21% -0.0432 0.4482 0.1598 2.0685 0.1109 0.0836 0.1453
(11) Market Size (Relative) 51.28% 71.79% -0.0462 0.4964 0.1648 2.1507 0.1241 0.0887 0.1790
(12) Turnover 56.41% 84.62% -0.0363 0.4649 0.1660 2.1931 0.1112 0.0835 0.1467
(13) Bank Development 97.44% 100.00% -0.0064 0.5149 0.2161 2.6058 0.1244 0.0951 0.1790
(14) January 55.13% 75.64% -0.0462 0.4407 0.1501 2.0238 0.1265 0.1051 0.1612QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 48
Table 5B2: Subsets of M EBA Time-Series Regressions (Table 5A, Chile) by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
Chile, March 1987 to December 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 2.56% 84.62% -0.1772 0.0362 -0.0749 1.7614 0.3516 0.3307 0.4222
(2) Price-to-Earnings 5.13% 61.54% -0.1772 0.0312 -0.0726 1.7144 0.3489 0.3212 0.4205
(3) Dividend Yield 0.00% 47.44% -0.1744 0.0338 -0.0703 1.6448 0.3453 0.3200 0.4214
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 0.00% 57.69% -0.1528 0.0283 -0.0607 1.6363 0.4073 0.3783 0.4299
(5) Momentum Proxy 0.00% 62.82% -0.1778 0.0309 -0.0716 1.7009 0.3451 0.3159 0.4194
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 0.00% 58.97% -0.1778 0.0326 -0.0702 1.6620 0.3432 0.3137 0.4173
(7) Inflation 0.00% 52.56% -0.1781 0.0426 -0.0664 1.5573 0.3521 0.3188 0.4057
(8) Inflation Volatility 0.00% 57.69% -0.1775 0.0362 -0.0697 1.6516 0.3428 0.3137 0.4143
(9) Population > 65 3.85% 79.49% -0.1958 0.0317 -0.0730 1.7564 0.3564 0.3357 0.4299
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 3.85% 78.21% -0.1958 0.0337 -0.0725 1.7237 0.3516 0.3308 0.4252
(11) Market Size (Relative) 2.56% 84.62% -0.1729 0.0426 -0.0740 1.7483 0.3518 0.3312 0.4286
(12) Turnover 0.00% 64.10% -0.1781 0.0325 -0.0714 1.6894 0.3439 0.3137 0.4161
(13) Bank Development 1.28% 32.05% -0.1958 0.0426 -0.0713 1.5750 0.3451 0.3210 0.4165
(14) January 0.00% 58.97% -0.1754 0.0362 -0.0688 1.6497 0.3502 0.3193 0.4299QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 49
Table 5B3: Subsets of M EBA Time-Series Regressions (Table 5A, Thailand) by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
Thailand, March 1987 to December 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 14.10% 28.21% -0.0735 0.1772 0.0479 1.3693 0.4794 0.4003 0.5708
(2) Price-to-Earnings 11.54% 12.82% -0.1026 0.1772 0.0360 1.0082 0.4765 0.3962 0.5666
(3) Dividend Yield 1.28% 7.69% -0.0987 0.1716 0.0345 0.9441 0.4657 0.3953 0.5615
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 1.28% 1.28% -0.1026 0.1772 0.0217 0.5379 0.4988 0.4339 0.5510
(5) Momentum Proxy 0.00% 0.00% -0.0894 0.1132 0.0087 0.3958 0.5279 0.4974 0.5905
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 1.28% 6.41% -0.0966 0.1698 0.0330 0.9181 0.4690 0.4099 0.5631
(7) Inflation 1.28% 6.41% -0.0997 0.1647 0.0301 0.8532 0.4697 0.4048 0.5645
(8) Inflation Volatility 2.56% 11.54% -0.0854 0.1664 0.0356 0.9978 0.4764 0.4188 0.5641
(9) Population > 65 5.13% 12.82% -0.1025 0.1333 0.0192 0.7004 0.5132 0.4578 0.5905
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 3.85% 15.38% -0.1000 0.1641 0.0506 1.2982 0.4722 0.3953 0.5850
(11) Market Size (Relative) 2.56% 12.82% -0.0994 0.1592 0.0320 0.9108 0.4820 0.3995 0.5858
(12) Turnover 2.56% 5.13% -0.0978 0.1620 0.0281 0.8314 0.4727 0.4109 0.5590
(13) Bank Development 5.13% 21.79% -0.0775 0.1333 0.0291 0.9679 0.5337 0.4894 0.5905
(14) January 1.28% 7.69% -0.1026 0.1718 0.0319 0.8836 0.4632 0.3953 0.5536QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 50
Table 5B4: Subsets of M EBA Time-Series Regressions (Table 5A, Greece) by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
Greece, March 1987 to December 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 3.85% 17.95% -0.0628 0.2091 0.0628 1.3622 0.1418 0.0929 0.3563
(2) Price-to-Earnings 10.26% 50.00% -0.0602 0.2352 0.0738 1.6368 0.1360 0.0848 0.3398
(3) Dividend Yield 10.26% 48.72% -0.0636 0.2288 0.0723 1.6027 0.1332 0.0793 0.3391
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 2.56% 8.97% -0.0590 0.1378 0.0381 1.2743 0.3321 0.3159 0.3664
(5) Momentum Proxy 5.13% 11.54% -0.0717 0.2110 0.0585 1.2826 0.1401 0.0840 0.3563
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 8.97% 44.87% -0.0533 0.2020 0.0693 1.6275 0.1532 0.1145 0.3435
(7) Inflation 10.26% 46.15% -0.0682 0.2135 0.0701 1.5737 0.1325 0.0792 0.3465
(8) Inflation Volatility 10.26% 51.28% -0.0626 0.2161 0.0744 1.6579 0.1360 0.0848 0.3465
(9) Population > 65 12.82% 39.74% -0.0648 0.2173 0.0713 1.5763 0.1369 0.0787 0.3408
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 58.97% 91.03% -0.0417 0.2352 0.0960 2.0986 0.1529 0.0942 0.3664
(11) Market Size (Relative) 2.56% 12.82% -0.0717 0.2000 0.0568 1.1813 0.1421 0.0897 0.3475
(12) Turnover 15.38% 48.72% -0.0668 0.2271 0.0726 1.6322 0.1364 0.0787 0.3664
(13) Bank Development 15.38% 48.72% -0.0717 0.2352 0.0735 1.6409 0.1346 0.0787 0.3438
(14) January 10.26% 48.72% -0.0689 0.2148 0.0708 1.5892 0.1319 0.0787 0.3406QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 51
Table 5B5: Subsets of M EBA Time-Series Regressions (Table 5A, Zimbabwe) by Factor (78 Regressions)
Doubtful Variable: Liberalise (8-month window)
Zimbabwe, March 1987 to December 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
%%
Significant Significant Lower Upper Average Average Average Minimum Maximum




(1) Price-to-Book 14.10% 26.92% -0.2531 0.0453 -0.0801 1.5463 0.1413 0.0648 0.4360
(2) Price-to-Earnings 14.10% 48.72% -0.2618 0.0464 -0.0829 1.6619 0.1592 0.0803 0.4507
(3) Dividend Yield 12.82% 21.79% -0.2558 0.0767 -0.0619 1.2187 0.1351 0.0484 0.4463
(4) Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 0.00% 1.28% -0.1276 0.0612 -0.0132 0.4710 0.4169 0.3674 0.4507
(5) Momentum Proxy 6.41% 14.10% -0.2235 0.0769 -0.0475 0.9278 0.1358 0.0215 0.4280
(6) Long-Run Contrarian Proxy 76.92% 85.90% -0.2618 0.0382 -0.1138 2.2349 0.1611 0.0824 0.4144
(7) Inflation 12.82% 19.23% -0.2448 0.0756 -0.0584 1.1772 0.1359 0.0377 0.4263
(8) Inflation Volatility 12.82% 19.23% -0.2518 0.0769 -0.0597 1.1702 0.1215 0.0215 0.4320
(9) Population > 65 12.82% 33.33% -0.2618 0.0744 -0.0683 1.3687 0.1394 0.0215 0.4507
(10) Institutional Investor Country Risk 12.82% 17.95% -0.2613 0.0755 -0.0614 1.2176 0.1301 0.0414 0.4413
(11) Market Size (Relative) 14.10% 30.77% -0.2603 0.0687 -0.0701 1.3672 0.1347 0.0460 0.4453
(12) Turnover 14.10% 21.79% -0.2549 0.0716 -0.0650 1.2655 0.1254 0.0311 0.4310
(13) Bank Development 14.10% 20.51% -0.2528 0.0761 -0.0620 1.2141 0.1291 0.0371 0.4379
(14) January 12.82% 19.23% -0.2539 0.0769 -0.0611 1.1910 0.1210 0.0215 0.4361QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 52
Appendix 1A
Correlation Matrix of Real Return (US$) and 14 ‘Doubtful’ Independent Variables
(11 Emerging Markets from March 1987 through December 1994)
(Observations=1034)
Short- Long- Institut-
8-month Run Run ional
Real Liberalise Price- Price- Contrar- Moment- Contrar- Popul- Investor Market Bank
Return Event to- to- Dividend ian um ian Inflation ation Country Cap Develop-
($) Window Book Earnings Yield Proxy Proxy Proxy Inflation Volatility > 65 Risk (% GDP) Turnover ment January
Real Return ($) 1.000
8-month Liberalise Event Window 0.058 1.000
Price-to-Book -0.046 -0.069 1.000
Price-to-Earnings -0.047 0.053 0.096 1.000
Dividend Yield 0.024 0.127 -0.247 -0.080 1.000
Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 0.031 0.045 0.048 0.014 -0.124 1.000
Momentum Proxy 0.026 -0.104 0.128 -0.094 -0.126 0.025 1.000
Long-Run Contrarian Proxy -0.082 -0.052 0.043 -0.007 0.080 -0.069 -0.099 1.000
Inflation -0.071 0.121 -0.162 0.105 0.040 0.033 0.021 -0.061 1.000
Inflation Volatility 0.018 0.185 -0.063 0.140 0.027 -0.035 -0.058 0.023 0.595 1.000
Population > 65 0.019 0.005 -0.186 -0.039 0.073 0.023 0.022 0.034 0.197 0.390 1.000
Institutional Investor Country Risk -0.034 -0.092 0.106 0.063 -0.121 -0.032 -0.062 -0.090 -0.385 -0.319 -0.202 1.000
Market Cap (% GDP) -0.032 -0.125 0.210 0.067 -0.137 0.019 0.040 -0.034 -0.203 -0.162 -0.098 0.517 1.000
Turnover -0.026 0.031 0.028 0.026 -0.132 0.030 -0.016 -0.038 -0.042 -0.056 -0.068 0.454 0.010 1.000
Bank Development -0.001 -0.010 -0.062 0.049 0.134 0.001 0.004 -0.103 0.377 0.110 -0.060 0.285 0.381 0.238 1.000
January 0.030 -0.005 -0.010 -0.031 0.003 0.097 0.022 -0.001 0.036 -0.027 -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 0.018 0.001 1.000QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS51 Page 53
Appendix 1B
Correlation Matrix of Real Return (US$) and 14 ‘Doubtful’ Independent Variables
(16 Emerging Markets from March 1987 through December 1997)
(Observations=2080)
Short- Long- Institut-
8-month Run Run ional
Real Liberalise Price- Price- Contrar- Moment- Contrar- Popul- Investor Market Bank
Return Event to- to- Dividend ian um ian Inflation ation Country Cap Develop-
($) Window Book Earnings Yield Proxy Proxy Proxy Inflation Volatility > 65 Risk (% GDP) Turnover ment January
Real Return ($) 1.000
8-month Liberalise Event Window 0.039 1.000
Price-to-Book -0.043 -0.072 1.000
Price-to-Earnings -0.040 0.034 0.108 1.000
Dividend Yield 0.028 0.089 -0.252 -0.114 1.000
Short-Run Contrarian Proxy 0.070 0.026 0.055 0.018 -0.075 1.000
Momentum Proxy 0.064 -0.051 0.133 -0.048 -0.117 0.067 1.000
Long-Run Contrarian Proxy -0.081 -0.042 0.074 0.010 -0.025 -0.067 -0.034 1.000
Inflation -0.039 0.106 -0.141 0.103 -0.013 0.038 0.050 -0.019 1.000
Inflation Volatility 0.025 0.143 -0.059 0.149 0.034 -0.028 -0.024 0.027 0.565 1.000
Population > 65 0.010 -0.012 -0.020 -0.004 0.030 0.010 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.082 1.000
Institutional Investor Country Risk -0.061 -0.093 0.115 0.085 -0.313 -0.055 -0.051 -0.014 -0.259 -0.252 0.250 1.000
Market Cap (% GDP) -0.051 -0.095 0.245 0.081 -0.245 -0.004 0.018 0.001 -0.169 -0.144 -0.106 0.491 1.000
Turnover -0.039 -0.003 0.029 0.054 -0.271 0.015 0.017 -0.003 0.002 -0.037 0.030 0.469 0.064 1.000
Bank Development -0.058 -0.013 0.016 0.053 -0.045 -0.050 -0.038 -0.064 0.218 0.014 0.044 0.378 0.511 0.217 1.000





Total Real Return ($) (Log Difference in Monthly Total
Return Index)
IFC (Emerging Markets Database) (Total Return Index)
Lagged Price-to-Book IFC
Lagged Price-to-Earnings IFC
Lagged Dividend Yield IFC
Lagged Total Real Return IFC (Total Return Index)
Average Six- to 12-Month Lag Return IFC (Total Return Index)
Average 13- to 24-Month Lag Return IFC (Total Return Index)
Inflation Rate IMF Internationanl Financial Statistics (IFS)
Inflation Volatility Estimates follow procedure in Schwert (1989, pp. 1117-
1118) and Levine and Zervos (1998b).
Population > 65 World Bank World Development Indicators 2000
Country Risk Ratings Institutional Investor (The surveys ask respondents to rate
country creditworthiness on a scale from 0 to 100, and
Institutional Investor adds greater weights to bankers with
larger international exposure.)
Market Cap (% GDP) Market capitalisation figures are from the IFC.  GDP figures
are from World Bank World Development Indicators 2000.
Turnover IFC (Emerging Markets Database)
Bank Development Total Domestic Credit Provided by the Banking Sector
(World Bank World Development Indicators 2000)